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Gender, Sex, and Sexualities in Psychology
EVA MAGNUSSON AND JEANNE MARECEK
P
sychologists’ interest in sex and gender was forged in the crucible 
of societal upheavals. By the end of the 19th century, feminists’ 
demands for suffrage, bodily autonomy, and legal and property 
rights were vigorously debated across Western Europe and the United 
States. Members of the fledgling discipline of psychology joined in those 
debates, offering a wide range of conjectures about women’s nature, differ­
ences between the sexes, and proper relations between men and women. 
In the latter decades of the 20th century, feminist movements emerged 
once again in much of Western Europe and North America. Feminists 
challenged discriminatory practices enshrined in law, custom, and reli­
gion that barred women from public life and subordinated them to men. 
Feminists in psychology were vigorous supporters of campaigns to end 
the pathologizing and criminalizing of nonheterosexual people. Feminists 
also called attention to the gender-based violence, rape, and sexual abuse 
that were part of the fabric of women’s lives. During this era of activism.
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vibrant intellectual communities of feminist psychologists took form in 
many countries (cf. Rutherford, Marecek, & Sheese, 2013). Some of these 
psychologists sought to understand the social processes and structures 
that sustained social inequalities; others wanted to understand how best 
to help women and girls from diverse communities, backgrounds, and 
classes flourish. Yet others turned their sight on men and boys and the 
strictures that conventional masculinities imposed on them.
In the decades since feminist psychology took form, there have been 
dramatic changes in women’s legal status, bodily and personal auton­
omy, freedom of movement, and access to education. In many parts of 
the world, there have been dramatic—albeit uneven and sometimes 
unstable—changes in womens participation in the public sphere. Intimate 
relations have changed as well, including norms and practices regarding 
patterns of cohabitation, marriage, childcare, and sexual encounters. In 
some parts of the world (especially in the global North), nonheterosex­
ual sexualities and same-sex relationships are now accorded both social 
acceptance and legal legitimacy. There is a growing acknowledgment that 
the gender binary (that is, the two-sex model) does not capture the variety 
of ways that people experience and express their gender. In many coun­
tries, political movements in support of transgender people and people 
with nonbinary gender identities have gained considerable momentum in 
assuring full recognition of these identities, as well as equitable treatment 
of such individuals in the public sphere and in personal life. The contribu­
tors to this book take stock of these changes in the social, political, and 
cultural landscape.
Turning back to the discipline of psychology and its neighboring dis­
ciplines, we can trace noteworthy advances in knowledge about human 
behavior. For example, new technologies in neuroimaging and genetic 
analysis have yielded substantial evidence for the plasticity of physical 
systems, as well as an emerging consensus that human brains are not sex- 
typed (cf.; Joel et al., 2015; Rippon, Jordan-Young, Kaiser, & Fine, 2014; 
Schmitz & Hoppner, 2014). Several of the chapters in this book describe 
these developments and what they portend for future theorizing about gen­
der, sex, and sexualities. At the same time, new concepts and approaches
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have made possible new understandings of sex, gender, and sexualities. As 
you will read in Chapter 2, intersectionality theory has drawn attention 
to the multiplicity of social identities people hold, and their implications 
for the way power is distributed in society. Cultural psychologies—which 
examine the mutual constitution of culture and persons—have given psy­
chologists new means of understanding subjectivity and social life. New 
research technologies have been devised. The Implicit Association Test 
(lAT), for example, which promises to tap implicit attitudes, has been 
harnessed to study prejudice (cf. Chapter 8). There have been advances 
in statistical procedures for modeling complex social processes, as well 
as etforts to improve the veracity and replicability of results of experi­
ments. At the same time, an array of qualitative methods has come into 
use (Levitt, Motulsky, Wertz, Morrow, & Pontoretto, 2017; Magnusson & 
Marecek, 2017). Some of these methods have been of special interest to 
feminists. Participatory methods, for example, forge direct links between 
activism and research. Critical discursive methods, discussed in Chapter 
6, give researchers tools for observing cultural resources.
In this chapter, we lay the groundwork to help you navigate the scholar­
ship on gender, sex, and sexualities. We present some central concepts in 
these fields, as well as tools for thinking about and asking questions about 
these concepts and their uses. As you will see, researchers have often given 
different meanings to these concepts, reflecting their different disciplinary 
backgrounds and different epistemological stances. We present the con­
cepts separately, casting their meanings in stark relief. We adopt this strat­
egy for clarity’s sake. In actual practice, you may find that authors splice 
together various meanings or shift from one usage to another.
We begin with a discussion of social categories and categorization, and 
then move to a focus on sex categories. Such a discussion is especially rel­
evant now because the customary sex categorizations, in particular, the 
two-sex model or gender binary, have been called into question by trans­
gender activists, queer theorists, and others who are gender nonconform­
ing. (Chapter 3 takes up nonbinary and transgender identities in detail.) 
Next we take up three concepts that psychologists employ with great fre­
quency, but with varying and sometimes ambiguous meanings: gender.
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difference, and ""the social” We examine the various meanings given to 
these concepts with the goal of helping you become a more discerning 
reader of the literature on gender, sex, and sexuality. We end this chapter 
with a set of questions to guide your reading of books and articles on the 
psychology of gender, sex, or sexualities.
SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND CATEGORIZATION
The term social category refers to a group of people who have a certain 
characteristic in common. People, of course, are members of several such 
groups. For example, a woman is a member of the category “women” and 
she is also a member of a certain social class, a certain ethnic group, a 
certain age group, and so on. Many such categorizations have cultural, 
social, and political significance. In many cases, membership in a social 
category also functions as a marker of social status; that is, membership in 
that category confers a particular location and ranking in the larger social 
structure. Social categories play an important part both in social life and 
in personal identity. We therefore discuss categories and categorizations 
in some detail.
People use categories to know about the world. They use their knowl­
edge about the characteristics of categories to decide which things are 
similar and which things are not. In everyday life such categorization is 
usually easy and uncontroversial. Note, however, that even when category 
membership seems uncontroversial and easy to decide (as, for example, 
membership in the categories “plants and animals ), the origin of the 
categories themselves may be controversial. This is especially true of cat­
egories that societies use to group and rank people (like “women,” “men, 
“gay,” or “straight”). Debates about the origins of categories have a lengthy 
history in philosophy (Hacking, 1994); these debates have also influenced 
psychologists’ studies of gender, sex, and sexuality. (Chapter 14 discusses 
additional aspects of categories and categorizations.)
Of interest here are two starkly different positions on the origin and 
nature of categories. One position holds that category systems are based in
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the world as it is in itself. Plato’s phrase “carving nature at its joints” nicely 
captures this point of view. It would follow from this position that human 
categories represent universal divisions that exist independently of cul­
ture and society, analogous to the division between the category “plants” 
and the category “animals.” On this view, the categories precede, and are 
discovered by, the knower. This is the commonsense view of many human 
categories—for example, the category “men” and the category “women” 
seem to capture a universal, enduring distinction among humans. Some 
may also regard racial categories (such as White, Asian, or Black) to be 
universal, enduring, and natural divisions of the human species, although 
the historical record does not support such beliefs. For those who regard 
certain human categories as universal, an important task is to identify, 
describe, and catalogue the distinctive properties of these categories. 
Often this involves comparing members of different categories in order 
to ascertain which properties are distinctive, as well as to ascertain which 
properties do not distinguish between the categories.
The second position regarding the origin and nature of social catego­
ries holds that many or even most human categories are human-made. 
Human-made categories are contingent; that is, they are products of peo­
ple’s efforts to understand the world. On this view, the categories are cre­
ated by knowers. Such creations are inevitably laced with presuppositions 
that are part of the time and place in which a person lives. One should 
not expect such categories to be universally held or to be unchanging. 
Nor should one assume that distinctions between such categories would 
be universally upheld. In this view of categories, the meanings given to 
categories are a matter of social negotiation.
Consider, for example, the category attention-deficit/hyperactivity dis­
order (ADHD). Most of us would agree that ADHD is a human-made 
category. It is of recent vintage, its definition (i.e., the “official” diagnostic 
criteria specified in diagnostic manuals) continually shifts, and it contin­
ues to spark a good deal of public controversy. Note that when we say that 
the category ADHD is human-made and contingent, we are not concerned 
with whether there are people who regulate attention and activity in a 
way that makes it difficult to function in some environments. Nor are we
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concerned with whether such difficulties might originate in brain func­
tion. Those concerns are different matters. We are instead referring to the 
set of meanings conferred on those difficulties by invoking the category 
ADHD. These meanings include, for instance, labeling the difficulties as a 
form of psychiatric illness and viewing the difficulties as requiring special 
educational accommodations and practices.
If a category is seen as human-made, it makes little sense to try to dis­
cover its fundamental or inherent properties. It should come as no surprise 
to find that many human-made categories have changed their meanings 
throughout history, and that some have disappeared entirely. Consider, 
for example, the categories “hysteria,” “latch-key children,” and “frigid 
women,” all of which were in common use in the United States until about 
40 years ago. Furthermore, if human categories are produced and upheld 
through social negotiations, then questions arise about which members 
of society have the power to define categories and to set the boundaries 
between them. By and large, people in positions of power and high status 
have been most successful in this boundary setting.
Sex Categories
What kind of categories are human sex categories? Are sex categories 
(such as “men,” “women,” “transgender,” and “intersex”) universal cat­
egories that preexist people’s efforts to make sense of the world? Or are 
they human-made categories that are contingent on time and place and 
wrought in the crucible of social interactions? The everyday view is that 
the sex categories “women” and “men” are natural and preexisting catego­
ries. In recent times, however, reports from non-Western societies, as well 
as the growing visibility of other sex categories in Western high-income 
societies, have challenged that view.
In many societies, sex category is one of the prime social categories 
used for describing people; sorting and ranking people according to their 
sex category has long been a linchpin of social organization. This is true 
in society at large, as well as in intimate relations such as marriages and
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families. Most Western high-income countries have firmly held in place 
a two-sex model based on the categories “men” and “women” (i.e., the 
gender binary). This model has been institutionalized in law and religion, 
and sex categorization has formed one of the major axes of privilege and 
hierarchy in formal social structures as well as in everyday interactions.
Even though the gender binary may seem natural and universal to 
some people, anthropologists and historians have amply documented 
that such a two-sex model is not a universal way of categorizing humans. 
Furthermore, many societies do not assign members to sex categories 
on the basis of genital anatomy or reproductive function. (Chapter 3 
describes several such instances.) In addition, societies throughout South 
and Southeast Asia have long recognized more than two sex categories 
(Blackwood, 2005; Morris, 1995). Against this background, and in the 
light of existing chromosomal variations, the biologist Anne Fausto- 
Sterling (2000) has suggested that a five-sex model more adequately cap­
tures human variation than a two-sex (or binary) model.
At present in Western European and North American societies, the 
two-sex model is being challenged on various fronts. As you will read 
in Chapter 3, the two-sex model does not capture current social reali­
ties in these societies. In addition, some neuroscientists have argued that 
although human reproductive anatomy and genitalia typically fit the two- 
sex model, the human brain does not (Joel et al., 2015).
Considering the varied ways in which human sex categories have been 
defined, given meaning, and even enumerated across societies, it is diffi­
cult to hold that sex categories are strictly natural categories that “carve 
nature at its joints.” A view of sex categories as human-made categories 
opens the way to a number of questions for psychological investigation. 
If the number and meanings of human sex categories are matters of social 
negotiation, what do those negotiations consist of? How do children and 
adults in a particular society make gender attributions? How do parents 
of gender-nonconforming children (for example, a child whose pre­
ferred self-presentation is as a member of a sex category other than the 
one assigned at birth) help their children move through a social world 
that is still largely organized according to a two-sex model? And, if the
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sex category system were expanded to encompass more than two sexes, 
would this change the existing patterns of inequality between women 
and men?
Gender
The word gender has become commonplace in everyday talk as well as in 
academic and professional psychology. Given how often and how casually 
people use the word, you might think that its meaning was unambiguous. 
However, this is far from the case. For instance, you will hear the word 
gender used as a synonym for “sex category” (as in “a persons gender” or 
“male gender”). Alternately, you might hear it used as an adjective that 
means “specific to a sex category” (as in “gender differences,” “gendered 
behavior”). Some scholars use the word gender to refer to a social sta­
tus that is an integral part of the social order. And “gender” is sometimes 
used as a stand-in for “women” (as in “gendercide” or “Gender Center” [to 
mean “Womens Center”]).
Looking at the psychological literature on gender and sexuality, we find 
that even among experts, there is no consensus about how to define gen­
der. Think about the following statements, all taken from recent textbooks 
on the psychology of gender;
“ ... gender [refers to] behaviors and attitudes that relate to (but are 
not entirely congruent with) biological sex.”
“ ... gender is a classification system that influences access to power 
and resources.”
“ . . . gender is the backcloth against which our daily lives are 
played out.”
“ ... gender refers to being a boy/man or a girl/woman in a cultural 
context.”
“... gender refers to the traits and behaviors considered characteristic 
of and appropriate to members of each [sex] category.”
“ ... gender affects people’s social lives.”
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Does it matter that experts in the field put forward so many incompati­
ble meanings of the term gender'? Yes, it does. Different ways of defining 
gender turn researchers’ attention toward different topics and questions. 
Just as important, any definition deflects researchers’ attention away from 
some questions and topics. Furthermore, differing ways of thinking about 
gender have different practical implications. For example, different mean­
ings of gender are conducive to different mental health interventions and 
to different social change programs. The experts’ statements that you have 
just read raise several questions:
■ What are the implications of thinking of gender as something 
that resides “inside” the person (e.g., as traits, dispositions, 
behaviors, hormones, or brain structures)?
■ Does it make sense to think of gender as if it were a force that 
has the power to exert “effects” on people?
■ What are the implications of thinking of gender as “outside” a 
person (e.g., as a societal “classification system” or “an integral 
part of the social order”)?
■ Should “gender” be used as a catch-all term for every aspect of 
human psychology that is related to sex category?
We do not propose to tell you what the correct meaning of gender ought 
to be. Instead, we focus on two meanings of gender. The first takes gender 
to refer to traits and characteristics that reside “inside” an individual. The 
second shifts the locus of gender to the social context, effectively placing 
it “outside” the individual.
Let us begin to clarify these two meanings with an illustration: For 
the past several decades, epidemiological studies in Western Europe and 
North America have shown that, by and large, women experience clinical 
depression and subclinical depressive symptoms at a rate that is roughly 
two and half times higher than men’s. (There are, of course, within-group 
variations for both sex categories.) Women’s elevated risk of depression 
has been a matter of great interest to mental health professionals for many 
years, and several explanations have been proposed.
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Some of the explanations rest on a conception of gender as character­
istics “inside” individuals. They have attributed womens elevated risk of 
depression to enduring characteristics or dispositions that are sex specific. 
Sigmund Freud, for example, argued that womens depression was an inev­
itable part of female nature—namely, a disguised manifestation of wom­
en’s despair over lacking a phallus. Other theories have attributed women’s 
depression to dysfunctional habits of thought, such as self-blaming attri- 
butional style or rumination, or to dysfunctional patterns of interacting 
with others, such as self-silencing. Yet other explanations have tied the 
increase in girls’ depression during adolescence to poor body image and 
acceptance of traditional stereotypes of feminine behavior. All of these 
explanations have in common a focus on “the inside,” that is, on disposi­
tions or characteristics that are thought to be prevalent among women.
Other explanations for women’s elevated risk of depression rest on a 
conception of gender as a principle by which society is organized and by 
which power and privilege are distributed to its members. Some explana­
tions of this type have linked depression to the heavy burdens of caring 
for others that women often shoulder and the limited care and support 
that women often receive from others. Other explanations have linked 
women’s depression to stressors connected to gendered power relations. 
These include various forms of sexual and relationship violence; work­
place harassment and discrimination; the paucity of social and economic 
supports for single mothers; and the social isolation often experienced by 
mothers of newborns. Other explanations have related elevated rates of 
depression and suicidal thoughts reported by lesbian and bisexual women 
to experiences such as taunting, bullying, teasing, ostracism from one’s 
family, and homophobic physical violence. These explanations all focus 
attention on the “outside,” that is, the social and cultural context. The 
lenses afforded by both these types of explanations are useful, but they 
point in different directions. Consider, for example, the kinds of preven­
tion programs or therapeutic interventions that follow from each.
Let us look more closely at these two ways of thinking about gender. 
We begin with a brief detour into etymology in order to examine the his­
tory of the word gender. “Gender” originates from the Latin word genus,
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which means “kind, sort, or class”; the word has been and still is used for 
this purpose by grammarians. In its grammatical meaning, gender does 
not refer to sex categories, but to the patterns for declining nouns that 
are found in many languages. The English language stopped declining 
nouns many hundred years ago, and, as you know, grammatical gender 
is not a feature of modern English. In recent times, English speakers have 
instead come to use the word gender as a synonym for “sex category” (as 
in “Indicate your gender: male or female”).
In the 1970s, feminist theorists in the English-speaking world expanded 
upon the English-language use of the word gender. They kept the reference 
to sex category, but they gave the word an additional meaning. This addi­
tional meaning is what is of interest here. Terms such as the sex!gender sys­
tem (Rubin, 1975) and the gender order indexed institutionalized relations 
of power and privilege that are organized around distinctions between 
sex categories. These definitions served to make gender a feature of the 
sociopolitical structure and of societal hierarchies in which sex categories 
serve as the markers of status and position. More recently, intersectional- 
ity theorists (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991) have pointed out that social 
categories are intertwined, such that systems of stratification and privilege 
cannot meaningfully be analyzed one by one. (Chapter 2 discusses inter- 
sectionality theory in detail.)
In psychology, the term gender and its meaning have a somewhat differ­
ent history. When gender entered the vocabulary of psychology at the end 
of the 1970s, the urgent agenda for feminists in psychology was to chal­
lenge beliefs regarding women’s nature. These beliefs—often enshrined by 
the psychological theories of the time—held women to be intellectually 
inferior to men; destined by nature for marriage and motherhood; incapa­
ble of leadership; naturally passive; and so on. Feminists strove to insert the 
term gender into psychology’s vocabulary in order to disrupt such asser­
tions about women’s nature (Crawford & Fox, 2007). They defined gender 
as the “nonphysiological components of sex” (Unger, 1979, p. 1086). This 
definition indicated a sharp demarcation between socially based charac­
teristics and physiologically based ones. Unger’s definition further speci­
fied that gender referred to “traits and behaviors” characteristic of the
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members of each sex category (p. 1093). This formulation—unlike those 
of Rubin and Crenshaw—had a distinctly individualist cast; that is, by 
defining gender as “traits,” “dispositions,” and “characteristics,” it placed 
gender firmly “inside” the individual.
Placing gender on the “inside” of the individual is still quite common 
in psychology. However, over the past 30 years, many feminist psycholo­
gists have moved toward thinking of gender as “outside” the individual 
(Magnusson & Marecek, 2012). That is, their work addresses aspects of 
the gender order and the fundamentally social quality of the distinctions 
that are drawn between the sexes. Several chapters that you will read take 
this approach, especially Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6. At the same time, cur­
rent research in developmental psychobiology, neuroscience, and behav­
ioral genetics has cast serious doubt on the idea of a dichotomy between 
“physiological” and “nonphysiological” that was the original rationale for 
introducing the term gender in psychology.
Reflections on the Meanings of Gender
What should a student make of the multiple meanings and complicated 
history of the term gender"? Perhaps the most important lesson is that when 
you read psychological literature that uses the word gender, you must ask 
yourself what the writer means by the word. Meanings of the word have 
shifted since it was taken into use by psychologists nearly 40 years ago. 
Writers may not signal to readers which meaning of gender they are invok­
ing in a particular argument. Also, it is not unusual that writers invoke 
several different meanings in a single article (or even perhaps in a single 
paragraph) without alerting their readers. There are also lessons for your 
own writing. You would do well to steer clear of misuses of the word gen­
der, such as “gendercide” or referring to the “gender” of animals. We also 
recommend that you avoid using “gender” as a euphemism for “women” 
and vague poetic expressions, such as “gender is a backcloth.” In any case, 
whenever you use the word gender, you must specify what you mean by 
it. In many instances, the term sex category might be a more appropriate 
choice because it does not carry implications regarding the origins of the 
differences between the categories.
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Differences
Differences between sex categories are common topics of conversation. 
Think about the times you heard someone exclaim, “Men are all alike!” 
or “That’s just like a woman!” Such claims about the way that men and 
women “just are” imply that all men or all women are the same and at 
the same time that all the members of one sex category are different from 
all the members of another. Such talk is sometimes followed by an asser­
tion that a purported difference is grounds for treating the sex categories 
unequally.
Let us look at a historical example, namely, the prolonged struggles dur­
ing the 19th century in Western Europe and North America over whether 
women should be allowed to vote in political elections. In the debates, 
assertions about women’s difference from men loomed large as reasons 
for denying women the vote. For example, women were said to be too 
emotional or too ignorant. In the same period, similar assertions of dif­
ferences between social categories were advanced to argue against grant­
ing the vote to working-class people and, in the United States, to African 
Americans. The comparisons that were drawn in these suffrage debates 
were loaded, taking certain characteristics of the dominant group (usu­
ally White, middle- or upper-class men) as the norm. This automatically 
ranked those in social categories that deviated in any way (whether rele­
vant or not) from the dominant group as being of lower worth.
Traces of this pattern of reasoning appear when people in a less val­
ued social category (such as “women”) are compared to people in a more 
highly valued social category (such as “men”). It is still not uncommon to 
regard certain characteristics of the members of the more highly valued 
category as the norm, again regardless of whether those characteristics are 
relevant for the issue at hand. Members of the less valued category must 
demonstrate those characteristics when, for instance, competing for a job. 
Furthermore, assertions can still be heard that virtually any difference 
from the valued social category constitutes a valid reason to oppose the 
equal treatment of members of the less-valued category. Such arguments, 
if drawn to their logical conclusion, would mean that in order to deserve
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equal treatment, people in the disfavored category would have to become 
identical in practically all respects to people in the highly valued category.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the debates about the 
sameness or differentness (and implicitly thereby the value) of the catego­
ries “men” and “women” have roiled the discipline of psychology since 
its very beginning in the late 19th century. In the debates about female 
suffrage, psychologists were sometimes called upon to pronounce author­
itatively on “woman’s nature” and what “woman’s difference from man” 
implied for women’s proper place in society and public life. For the most 
part, psychologists in that era shared the beliefs about women’s inferi­
ority that permeated Western European and North American societies 
(Richards, 2010).
Researchers who study differences between the two sex categories typ­
ically compare two groups that are each composed of members of one 
sex category. Finding a statistically significant difference between the two 
groups, however, is not the end of the study. The crucial step is to interpret 
such differences. Since the inception of psychology, there has been contin­
ual debate about how to interpret observed differences. In what follows, 
we describe three ways of interpreting observed differences between sex 
categories. In debates, these ways, in the stark form that we describe them, 
are often set against one another, although in actual practice, researchers 
sometimes combine them to yield more complex understandings. We end 
this section by taking up some of the logical and methodological com­
plexities of carrying out studies comparing men and women and inter­
preting the results.
Seeing Observed Psychological Sex Differences as Caused 
BY Inherent Physiologically Based Differences Between 
THE Sex Categories
In one view of “difference,” an observed difference (in some aspect of 
behavior) between a group of men and a group of women is interpreted as 
caused by some inherent—that is, inborn and permanent—physiological 
difference. Suppose a researcher compares how a group of men and a group 
of women perform on a cognitive task, and the data indicate a difference
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in performance between the two groups. A researcher taking this view will 
assume that the cause of the observed difference is some inherent physio­
logically based characteristic shared by members of one category but not 
the other. Throughout the history of psychology, researchers have posited 
such possible causal characteristics in many sites, such as men’s and wom­
en’s sexual organs; their levels of certain hormones; sex-specific genetic 
make-up; and the development of certain brain structures.
Seeing Observed Psychological Sex Differences as Caused 
BY Inherent, Psychologically Based Differences Between 
THE Sex Categories
Another view of the causes of observed sex differences postulates that 
observed differences between women and men are caused by differences 
between the sex categories in some inherent psychological characteris­
tic that is the enduring effect of sex-specific childhood socialization. Let 
us again say that a researcher compares a group of men and a group of 
women on a cognitive task and that the data indicate a difference between 
the two groups. A researcher taking this view will interpret this difference 
to be caused by sex-specific childhood experiences that have shaped girls 
and boys psychologically. One example of such theorizing is found in psy­
choanalytic theories, which hold that early childhood experiences inev­
itably differ for boys and girls and lead to different inherent personality 
patterns in adult men and women. Another example of such theorizing is 
found in social learning theories that argue that sex differences in adults 
are caused by the long-term effects of early experiences in which boys and 
girls were reinforced for different behaviors.
Seeing Observed Sex Differences as Caused by Differential 
OR Unequal Treatment
Feminists in psychology have repeatedly challenged assertions that 
observed differences between men and women should be seen as based in 
inherent differences between those two sex categories. Instead, they have 
argued that many observed sex differences are in fact the consequences of 
ongoing differential treatment of boys and girls, or men and women. An
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earlier case in point was that in most Western high-income countries, 
boys scored consistently higher than girls on mathematics tests. Feminist 
psychologists argued that these findings could well be the result of une­
qual access to schooling in mathematics, rather than genetic or brain dif­
ferences between the two sexes. Changes in mathematics performance in 
recent decades would seem to have vindicated the feminists’ view. Today, 
with math training for boys and girls roughly comparable, the earlier aver­
age differences between boys’ and girls’ scores on standardized math tests 
and in mathematics performance in school have dramatically diminished, 
sometimes to the point of vanishing. In some countries, they have even 
been reversed (Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams, 2008).
Feminists in psychology have also studied settings in which individu­
als in a certain social category (for example, a certain sex category) are 
evaluated like or treated as the stereotype of that category, not as individu­
als. Recent attention has focused on the experiences of women in science, 
technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) profes­
sions and female students who aspire to enter such professions. A number 
of studies have suggested that some members of the scientific commu­
nity still regard women’s scientific capabilities as inferior to those of men; 
this is especially true for women of color (Muhs, Niemann, Gonzalez, & 
Harris, 2012; Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoli, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012).
Reflections on Studying Differences
Methodologists have pointed out several cautions that researchers must 
exercise when carrying out and interpreting comparisons of differ­
ent social categories. The first caution applies to any study that explores 
observed differences between groups, regardless of the specific groups or 
the probable cause of the difference. This caution is based on the fact that 
studies that find statistically significant differences between the means 
of two groups (such as a group of men and a group of women) typically 
also find substantial overlap between the two groups. Take, for example, 
a study of performance on a cognitive task (such as a mathematics test). 
Suppose that a researcher finds a mean difference between the boys and 
girls in the study. Along with the mean difference, there will also be a good
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deal of variation among the girls and among the boys, such that the size of 
the mean difference between the two groups is only a small fraction of the 
variation in performance that the boys and girls share. This is a common 
pattern of findings in sex difference studies. Such findings refute the view 
that the categories girls and boys are homogeneous.
A second caution is that if researchers intend to make group compari­
sons, they must take care to assure that the groups they study are com­
parable in all respects other than their group membership. Otherwise, a 
researcher cannot attribute an observed difference between the groups to 
their category membership.
In sex difference studies, researchers must therefore ensure that the 
group of men and the group of women are comparable on relevant char­
acteristics. This means that the groups must be selected so that they are 
equivalent as regards relevant prior experience, as well as educational 
background, age, social class, and racial or ethnic category. Depending on 
what is being studied, composing comparable groups of men and women 
can be very difficult, and sometimes impossible.
A third caution in designing studies of group comparisons is that the 
indices and tasks to be studied must be equivalent for the groups. For 
example, the test materials or tasks must be equally familiar to and equally 
suitable for both groups. The same holds for the content and wording of 
scale items. For example, response biases such as the social desirability 
of the scale items must be comparable for the groups under study. With 
regard to comparing men and women, the more the two sex categories are 
segregated in daily life and the more they are channeled by society into 
different roles, the less likely it is that these requirements will be met.
A fourth caution concerns the logic of sex difference studies. To use tech­
nical language, sex category is not an independent variable that research­
ers can manipulate, nor is it an experimental condition to which research 
participants can be assigned. These limitations mean that sex difference 
studies are correlational studies, not causal studies. In correlational stud­
ies, an association between two variables (in this case, sex category and a 
pattern of behavior) tells the researcher nothing about causality. This fact 
presents a knotty problem for researchers who seek to determine whether
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psychological differences between men and women are the result of inher­
ent differences. Associations between observed sex differences in behavior 
and sex differences in a biological structure or function can tell nothing 
about causation. Put differently: finding a sex difference in behavior and 
an associated sex difference in a physiological structure or function does 
not indicate that the latter caused the former.
As a final reflection, given the formidable difficulties in carrying out 
adequate and interpretable studies of sex differences, it is remarkable 
that the search for psychological sex differences has continued for over 
100 years, whereas similarities between the two sex categories are rarely a 
topic of interest (Hyde, 2005).
THE “SOCIAL”
Like many other terms that feminist scholars use, the word social has 
several different meanings in social science research. This should not be 
surprising. Different disciplines in the social sciences, as well as different 
theoretical traditions in psychology, have focused on different aspects of 
social life.
Many social psychologists who study gender—especially social psy­
chologists in the United States—have limited their scope of interest in 
“the social” to how each individual experiences others, for example, the 
judgments they render about one another and the personal consequences 
of such judgments. “The social” as a collective force usually is beyond the 
scope of investigations. This has led to a focus on individual attitudes, 
beliefs, prejudice, and attributions of causality, rather than on larger 
societal forces or structures. Psychologists who are interested in gen­
der have, for example, studied prejudicial beliefs and invidious attitudes 
about members of disfavored social categories (women, LGB individuals, 
members of non-White ethnic/racial groups, and, more recently, trans- 
gendered or gender-nonconforming individuals). Psychology research­
ers have also asked how research participants regard (and interact with) 
others who do not conform to societal norms (e.g., scientifically inclined
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women or “sissy” boys). They also have examined the psychological con­
sequences of being the object of such invidious distinctions—for example, 
diminished self-esteem or self-confidence, heightened depressive affect, 
or diminished well-being. Psychologists have also studied how individu­
als allocate blame and responsibility for sexual harassment, abuse, and 
rape. (Chapter 3 discusses research regarding the consequences of prej­
udicial treatment for LGB, transgendered, and gender-nonconforming 
individuals, and Chapter 8 describes research about implicit and explicit 
biases and prejudicial beliefs about women and about members of other 
disfavored social categories.) As you can see, all these studies focus on 
individuals—their reactions, judgments, or attributions, beliefs about 
stereotypes, and so on; there is little attention paid to social structures or 
to the gender order.
A second aspect of “the social” is society, that is, large-scale and highly 
organized social groups. Societies are stratified into status groups, with 
differing amounts of power and privilege available to members of these 
status groups. Societies are governed by formal institutions but also by 
shared, often informal, norms. In most societies, sex categorizations form 
a prominent axis along which people are ordered and social status is 
assigned, as do racial or ethnic categorizations.
Although few psychologists have studied societal hierarchies and social 
stratification, some feminist psychologists have addressed questions 
about how the gender order intersects with class stratification. In Britain, 
Walkerdine, Lucey, and Melody (2001) have examined how class position 
shapes the life trajectories and developmental imperatives of working- 
class girls. Other British feminist psychologists have also studied class and 
motherhood (Rickett, 2016). Psychologists interested in intersectionality 
theory are seeking ways to incorporate axes of social organization such as 
sex categorization, racial/ethnic categorization, and social class into psy­
chological research.
A third aspect of “the social” has also garnered a good deal of interest 
among feminist psychologists. This aspect concerns the ways in which day- 
to-day living is shaped by the cultural context of people’s lives. Examples 
of the topics that have been investigated include the negotiations about
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sharing housework and childcare (Magnusson, 2008) and the “cultural 
scaffolding” that maintains (hetero)sexual coercion and rape (Gavey, 
2005). Feminist psychologists have also investigated real-time practices 
and interactions in societal institutions. Some examples are analyses of 
courtroom dialogue during rape trials; observations of psychologists’ 
discussions as they certify or deny patients’ requests for gender reas­
signment surgery; and conversations between doctors and their female 
patients about prescriptions for antidepressant medication. In such stud­
ies, researchers have sought insight into the everyday practices and insti­
tutional forces that maintain the status quo and hold power differences in 
place. Many of these researchers have found that the theories and methods 
of discursive psychology offer a useful framework for situating individuals 
within cultural life and societal structures. We therefore take a moment to 
introduce feminist discursive psychology.
Feminist Discursive Psychology: From “the Social” to 
the Sociocultural
Feminist discursive psychologists have taken inspiration from such theo­
retical frameworks as sociocultural psychology, cultural psychology, and 
discursive psychology. They share with many feminist psychologists an 
interest in socially shared views of gender and other social categories. 
Feminist discursive psychologists diverge, however, from other feminist 
psychologists in that they do not regard people’s views about gender as 
enduring individual attitudes or opinions. Instead, feminist discursive 
psychologists conceive of such views as the ways of understanding that 
are available in a certain social setting and that serve as resources for mak­
ing sense of the world and oneself. An example would be the notion that 
there are immutable psychological differences between women and men. 
In a cultural setting where this is a shared understanding, people will be 
more prone to take note of differences between men and women and to 
overlook similarities, and to use it to account for their own behavior and 
that of others. Feminist discursive psychologists view these shared ways of
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understanding as tools that people use in interactions in order to accom­
plish such goals as portraying themselves in a positive light (Edley, 2001; 
Magnusson 8c Marecek, 2012, 2015, 2018). Chapter 6 describes feminist 
discursive psychology in more detail.
BEING A DISCERNING READER OF RESEARCH 
ON GENDER, SEX, AND SEXUALITY
We end this chapter by suggesting some strategies for reading that will 
help you master the literature on gender, sex, and sexuality. This schol­
arship is complex and growing; few questions can be considered settled, 
even including what are the best methods of investigation. Moreover, 
many issues evoke debate not only in the scholarly community but also 
in the political arena and in popular culture. This state of affairs calls for 
careful and critical readings of the literature.
Critical reading as a scholar goes beyond reading for the “bare facts”; it 
requires discernment and engagement with the works that you are read­
ing. If you are reading a research report, you need to think carefully about 
the methods by which the findings were produced, as well as the logic of 
the interpretations that the authors make. This is necessary because data 
rarely, if ever, “speak for themselves.” If you are reading a theoretical argu­
ment, you need to situate that argument in the context of the author s ori­
enting assumptions and point of view, in order to appraise the evidence 
that is offered in support of the argument. Also you need to consider what 
the author regards as alternative or competing arguments. For instance, 
if the theory is advanced as an improvement over previous theories, what 
are those previous theories, and are they fairly presented?
In what follows, we suggest some questions that pertain specifically 
to the psychological literature on gender, sex, and sexuality. We drew up 
these questions to help our own students become adept readers of the psy­
chological literature. They have found them helpful and we hope you will, 
too. We encourage you to use these questions both in your own reading 
and when reading and discussing with others.
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Interpreting Group Differences
If a research study reports an observed difference between social catego­
ries (for example, sex categories or categories pertaining to sexualities), 
how does the author interpret this difference? Does the author discuss 
how differences in past experiences or in current conditions might have 
influenced the results? Or does the author attribute the observed differ­
ences to some inherent difference between the categories? On what basis 
does the author rule out alternate interpretations?
Homogeneity or Heterogeneity of Social Categories
Does the researcher portray sex categories and other social categories 
as if they were homogeneous groups? Does the researcher examine (or 
at least discuss) possible differences among members of each category? 
(Chapter 14 discusses this matter in more detail.) Given the nature of the 
study, which of these approaches seems appropriate?
Familiar or Unfamiliar Research Situations
Have the researchers ascertained that the research situation is equally 
familiar and comfortable for participants regardless of their sex category 
or other social categorizations? Or are there grounds for concern that the 
conditions of the research could disfavor members of some social groups? 
What might this imply for the trustworthiness of the results?
Measurement Equivalence
If a researcher has used concepts, scales, or behavioral measures that 
were designed for one cultural setting or one social group in a different
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setting or with a ditferent social group, what evidence is offered that 
the meanings in the new setting are equivalent to those in the original 
setting?
Generalizations
Consider carefully which groups of people researchers have studied, and 
which groups of people they draw conclusions about. For example, does 
an author exercise appropriate caution about generalizing from the spe­
cific participants who were studied (e.g., female college students) to an 
entire category (e.g., “women” or “lesbians”)? Under what conditions are 
such broad conclusions warranted?
Universalizing Versus Specifying
Do the researchers use their study of specific situations and specific par­
ticipants to draw conclusions about universal abilities or characteris­
tics? Do the researchers discuss why such generalizations are warranted? 
Alternately, do the researchers keep their focus on socially anchored 
meanings in different social categories or different social and cultural 
settings?
Locus of Explanation: Inside the Individual or in 
the Context?
Does the author offer explanations or interpretations of behavior that 
focus exclusively on causes “inside” the individual? Or do the explana­
tions or interpretations also consider the “outside,” that is, the surround­
ing conditions, especially structural inequalities? Do authors endeavor to 
show how these might be connected?
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Authors’ Biases
Can you discern indications of biased or prejudiced views or prereflec- 
tive understandings on the part of the author? This could include biases 
against women or against men, biases against nonheterosexual people, 
or biases against children or adults who do not conform to the gender 
binary. If you believe that you have detected biased points of view, con­
sider whether those views might have influenced aspects of the research 
method, the interpretation of the findings, or the practical implications or 
policy recommendations that the author suggests.
Reflexivity About the Social Context of Research
Do the researchers acknowledge that every research project is carried out 
in a social, political, historical, and geopolitical context? Do the research­
ers discuss how the context might have influenced the research questions, 
the research design, and the research process?
Silences and Exclusions
If you are reading a book or article that does not deal specifically with gen­
der, sex, or sexualities, can you discern instances where the author might 
have (or even should have) brought in such issues? When a book or article 
ignores these issues, what might be the consequences for the quality of the 
information or arguments it puts forward?
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